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FEDERAL

COURTS-A

DUE

PROCESS

LIMITATION ON

THE

SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX CIVIL
LITIGATION-ln re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litiga

tion, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether juries should continue to be used to decide civil
cases is an issue of vigorous controversy.! Although the debate
touches upon the entire range of civil litigation, it has begun to fo
cus on the particularly problematic area of jury use in complex liti
gation. The advent of giant, multinational corporations and their
increasing use of the courts to resolve business disputes has cre
ated the problem of the "big" case. The sheer volume, intricacy,
and length of these cases has led even the most ardent supporters
of the civil jury trial to question the wisdom of its continued use in
complex litigation. 2
The concern that a lay jury may not possess the requisite
background and knowledge to resolve complex legal and factual is
sues rationally has reached constitutional dimensions. The right to
a civil jury trial, protected under the seventh amendment, has
come into conflict with the rights protected under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. By balancing the interests and
rights protected under both amendments, the court in In re Japa
nese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation 3 sought to determine
the circumstances under which the due process clause limits the
right to a civil jury in complex litigation.
After briefly tracing the history of seventh amendment adjudi
cation, this note will explain the nature of the due process ap
1. For a thorough critique of the civil jury, see J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
(1949). For a defense of the civil jury, see C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY
(1962); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964); Summers,
Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1964).
2. Two cases clearly demonstrate the nature of protracted complex litigation. In
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the esti
mated length of trial was five months. The parties called 87 witnesses. The testi
mony filled more that 19,000 pages of transcript and more than 2,300 exhibits were
admitted into evidence. In In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D.
702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), the estimated length of trial was two years. The Judge esti
mated that 100,000 pages of evidence would be presented at trial, enough to form a
stack over 40 feet high.
3. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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proach and how it represents a marked departure from past inter
pretations of the seventh amendment jury trial right. The due
process approach then will be evaluated, with emphasis on
whether it represents a more effective method of dealing with the
problem of jury use in complex litigation. Potential problems with
the due process approach will be highlighted, including its possible
effect upon the right to jury trial in the context of the broad range
of contemporary civil litigation. Finally, this note will recommend
various procedures that will permit the interests protected by the
due process clause and the seventh amendment to coexist within a
complex case. Aside from reconciling the conflict between the fifth
and seventh amendments, these procedures assure that justice
will be rendered in complex trials. No particular procedure will be
proposed as the ultimate solution. Instead, this note will propose
an approach to -the problem that courts should follow when con
fronted with a complexity challenge to a jury trial demand.

II.

FACTS

The nature and scope of complex litigation are typified by the
facts of Japanese Electronic Products. This litigation began in 1976
when National Union Electric Corp. (NUE) filed suit against sev
eral Japanese competitors.4 NUE's complaint alleged that, begin
ning as early as 1960, defendants had violated the 1916 Anti
dumping Act> by selling televisions in the United States at artifi
cially low prices in an attempt to drive American producers out of
the American television market. NUE further alleged that these
dumping practices· were the result of a conspiracy involving de
fendants and ninety other firms from around the world. NUE con
tended that defendants' activities violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act6 and the Wilson Tariff Act. 7 NUE sought treble damages and
injunctive relief. 8
Four years later Zenith Radio Corp. filed the second com
plaint in this litigation. The complaint contained allegations of ille
4. The defendants were Mitsubishi Corp., Matsushita Electrical Indus., Co.,
Toshiba Corp" Hitachi, Ltd., Sharp Corp., Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., Sanyo Elec. Co.,
and Sony Corp. Nine subsidiaries of these companies were also named as defendants
in National Union Elec. Corp.'s [hereinafter referred to as NUE] action. 631 F.2d at
1072.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
6. Id. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1, 2.
7. Id. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8, 73.
8. 631 F.2d at 1072.

1981]

JURY TRIALS IN COMPLEX LITIGATION

549

gality similar to those asserted by NUE. 9 The Zenith complaint
named the same defendants as those named in the NUE action as
well as Motorola, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck, and Co., two American
companies. Zenith additionally asserted a Robinson-Patman ActIO
violation based on defendants' alleged price discrimination in do
mestic sales. Zenith's final allegation was that two defendants vio
lated section 7 of the Clayton Act l l by acquiring interests in do
mestic producers of electronic products. Zenith also sought treble
damages and injunctive relief.12
A group of Japanese defendants filed two counterclaims. The
first charged Zenith with various violations of the Sherman Anti
trust Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. The second charged Ze
nith and thirty coconspirators with maintaining a program of sham
litigation against Zenith's competitors. 13 Defendant Sears, Roe
buck, and Co. filed a separate counterclaim, alleging that Zenith's
advertisement claim that its televisions were manufactured exclu
sively with American components was false and thus was in viola
tion of the Landam Act. 14
The Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation ordered a consoli
dation of the Zenith and NUE suits. 15 Zenith and NUE then made
timely demands for a jury trial. Fourteen defendants moved to
strike the demand on the ground that the suit's complexity ren
dered it inappropriate for jury determination. The United States
District Court [or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied de
fendants' motion, holding that the seventh amendment does not
recognize a complexity exception to the right to jury trial. 16 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, con
cluding that the due process clause of the fifth amendment pre
cludes trial by jury when the complexity of a case prevents a jury
from performing its decisionmaking function with a reasonable un

9. Zenith sought damages over a longer period of time than NUE, and the al
leged antidumping violations involved electronic products other than televisions. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
11. Id. § 18.
12. 631 F.2d at 1072.
13. Id. at 1072-73.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976).
15. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 565 (Jud. Pan. Multi.
Lit. 1975).
16. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d at 1084 [hereinafter referred to as Japanese Electronic Prod
ucts ].
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derstanding of the evidence and the relevant legal rules. 17 The
Third Circuit would deny a demand for a jury trial when examina
tion of the factors contributing to complexity18 makes it apparent
that a jury will not be able to decide the case rationally. 19

III.

HISTORY OF SEVENTH AMENDMENT ADJUDICATION

The Historical Test
The seventh amendment provides that "in suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right to trial by jury shall be preserved. "20 To determine when
a jury trial is constitutionally mandated, the amendment requires
an historical inquiry into whether the claim would have been con
sidered legal or equitable in 1791, the year the seventh amend
ment was adopted. 21 If the action in question would have been
tried at law rather than in equity in 1791, the action must be tried
before a jury. 22
Although this approach seems appealingly straightforward, it
has been difficult to apply.23 It has been criticized as unrealistic
and static, resulting in a "distribution of responsibility based on an
historical division largely motivated by factors now irrelevant. "24
Similarly, one commentator has questioned the utility of the ap
proach, saying that "contemporary civil litigation . . . [involves]
subject matter and procedural patterns unused, and sometimes un
known, in 1791. "25

A.

17. 631 F.2d at 1084.
18. The court of appeals identified three factors that a court should consider in
assessing a suit's complexity: First, the overall size of the suit, determined by the
length of trial, the amount of evidence, and the number of issues that require indi
vidual consideration; second, the conceptual difficulties of the facts and legal issues,
to be determined by the amount of expert testimony and the length and detail of the
jury instructions; and third, the difficulty of segregating distinct aspects of the case.
[d. at 1088-89.
19. [d. at 1089.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
21. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302,
14 (1971).
22. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830). The historical
test would establish a fixed class of cases considered legal. See·Wolfram, The Consti
tutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 641-42 (1973).
23. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 2302, at 16.
24. Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1190 (1961).
One court has complained of being held in "historical bondage." Gefen v. United
States, 400 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1968).
25. McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon
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Toward a More Flexible Approach

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the distinction
between law and equity.26 Actions are no longer brought as either
actions at law or suits in equity. Rather, the Federal Rules created
a single form of action embracing all claims and offering all reme
dies. 27 Federal courts thus are empowered to exercise both legal
and equitable jurisdiction within a single action.
When legal and equitable claims are intertwined in the same
action, the historical test provides little guidance in determining
the litigants' jury trial rightS. 28 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 29
embodies many of the problems created by these new hybrid forms
of action. In Beacon, Plaintiff Fox filed a complaint for declaratory
relief, praying for an injunction to prevent Defendant Beacon from
instituting an antitrust action against him.30 Beacon then filed a
counterclaim against Fox, alleging violation of the antitrust laws. 31
Beacon promptly demanded a jury trial on the antitrust counter
Claim. The district court, however, considered the injunctive relief
sought by Fox to be purely equitable. 32 The mixture of legal and
equitable claims within the same action prompted the district court
to invoke the equitable clean-up doctrine. Once a court sitting in
equity obtained jurisdiction over a suit primarily equitable in char
acter, the equitable clean-up doctrine allowed the court to retain
jurisdiction and to decide any incidental legal issues that arose in
the course of the action. 33 Additionally, the doctrine provided that
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1,2 (1967).
Despite criticism of the historical approach, two recent Supreme Court decisions
indicate that it is still viable in determining seventh amendment jury trial rights. In
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1974) and Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416
U.S. 363, 364-65 (1974), the Court granted jury trials because each action involved
rights and remedies of the sort traditionally heard by a jury at common-law. For a
more extensive discussion of the Court's resort to the historical test, see Comment,
The Seventh Amendment-A Return to Fundamentals, 10 URB. L. ANN. 313 (1975).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 provides that "There shall be one form of action to be
known as a 'civil action: "
27. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970).
28. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 2302, at 17. See generally
McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IOWA L. REV. 726 (1960);
Morris,Jury Trial Under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEX. L. REV. 427
(1942).
29. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
30. Id. at 502-03.
31. Id. at 503.
32. Id.
33. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 52, at
121 (2d ed. 1948).
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it was within the court's discretion to decide the order in which
the equitable claims were to be tried to the court. The doctrine's
purpose was to promote judicial economy and efficiency under the
bifurcated system. 34 It allowed a judge to dispose of both equitable
and incidental legal claims within the same action. Consequently,
courts were freed from the need to order a separate jury trial for
the legal claims. Consolidation of legal and equitable claims also re
lieved the parties of the expense of having to spend additional time
in court. 3S
Applying the clean-up doctrine, the district court in Beacon
Theatres ordered that the injunction issue be tried to the court
first, even though a determination of this equitable claim had the
effect of disposing of Beacon's legal claim without a jury trial
through res judicata or collateral estoppei.36 The United States Su
preme Court rejected the clean-up doctrine, stating that equity ju
risdiction exists only when legal remedies are inadequate. 37 The in
adequacy of a legal remedy must be determined "not by
precedents decided under discarded procedures . . . but in light of
remedies now . . . available"38 under contemporary procedures.
The Court reasoned that, since the Federal Rules allowed legal and
equitable claims to be resolved in one action, the use of the
clean-up doctrine to reduce costs and to prevent a multiplicity of
suits was unjustified. 39 The court could simply try the legal issues
34. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 452
(3rd ed. 1976).
35. The clean-up doctrine was designed to avoid the hardship caused by the
existence of separate courts of law and equity. If a court sitting in equity refused to
grant incidental legal relief, the plaintiff would have had to bring an entirely new ac
tion.
36. 359 U.S. at 504-05.
37. Id. at 506-07.
3B. Id. at 507. For the purposes of this note, it is important to remember that
the principle enunciated in Beacon Theatres, that equity jurisdiction is available
only when legal remedies are inadequate, was applicable only to cases where proce
dures were inadequate at common-law. See McCoid, supra note 25, at 12-13. Accord
ingly, the Court held that where the remedy at law is adequate in light of contempo
rary procedures, equity lacks jurisdiction, even though such jurisdiction might have
been invoked under earlier procedures. Id. This interpretation is significant because
the inadequacy of a legal remedy standard established in Beacon Theatres does not
suggest an inquiry into the inadequacy, competence, or appropriateness of a jury trial
in a particular type of suit. The principle "alters the historical result only as proce
dural obstacles to an adequate remedy at law, [such as delay and multiplicity 1. are
removed by reform." Id.
39. 359 U.S. at 50B. Since the plaintiff could present both his legal and equita
ble claims in one action under the merged system, he was no longer forced to file a
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to a jury and the equitable issues to a judge, all within the same
action. In addition, the Court established that only under the most
imperative circumstances can the right to jury trial be lost through
a prior determination of equitable claims. 4o The order of trial must
be so arranged that issues common to both the legal and equitable
claims are tried to a jury before the court passes on any purely eq
uitable claims. 41
The movement toward a more flexible approach to the inter
pretation of the seventh amendment continued in Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood. 42 Although the Dairy Queen plaintiffs sought relief
in the form of an equitable accounting, the Court held that the
remedy at law was adequate and thus that the action was triable to
a jury.43 An equitable accounting, the Court declared, is only avail
able upon a showing that the" 'accounts between the parties' are
of such a 'complicated nature' that only a court of equity coQ.ld sat
isfactorily unravel them. "44

C.

Complexity of the Action as Ground for EqUitable Jurisdiction
The decisions in Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres have
clearly enlarged the right to a jury trial at the expense of tradi
tional equity jurisdiction. 45 The Court in Dairy Queen, however,
did recognize the possibility that the complexity of a suit may
render it inappropriate for jury determination. The Court consid
ered complexity as a ground for ordering a nonjury trial. 46 The noseparate legal action if equity failed to grant incidental legal relief. Id. Since the rea
son for the equitable clean-up doctrine was gone, the Court chose to discard it. Id.
40. Id. at 51D-II.
41. The thrust of the opinion in Beacon Theatres, as interpreted by the Court
in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), is that when legal and equitable
claims are joined in one action and the claimant is entitled to a jury trial of the legal
issues, such issues must be submitted to a jury upon timely demand regardless of
whether they are incidental to the equitable issues. Id. at 472-73.
For a thorough discussion of Beacon Theatres, see James, Right to Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963); McCoid, supra note 25 at 1. For a fuller un
derstanding of the equitable clean-up doctrine, see Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and
the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1950).
.
42. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
43. Id. at 477-78. The Court held that the constitutional right to trial by jury
cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings. Id.
44. Id. at 478.
45. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2302, at 21-22. Moreover, the
Court in Beacon Theatres stated that a jury trial is a constitutional right; a nonjury
trial is not. 359 U.S. at 510.
46. The Court's decision, however, should be read as applying only to suits
seeking an equitable accounting. Furthermore, the Court stated that in view of the
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tion that an issue may be beyond the abilities of a jury to decide
rationally was acknowledged in Ross v. Bernhard. 47 The Court in
Ross stated in a footnote that whether an issue is legal or equitable
and, thus, whether there is a right to a jury trial, is to be deter
mined by considering "first, the pre-merger custom . . . ; second,
the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations
of juries. "48
The first two criteria can be interpreted as a restatement of
the historical test. 49 The source of the third criterion, the practical
abilities and limitations of juries, is not as easy to identify.
Nonetheless, the third criterion suggests that the courts must in
quire into the kinds of cases that may prevent a jury from per
forming its decisionmaking function rationally. In such a case the
court may refuse to grant a jury trial. 50
Efforts by the federal courts to determine the significance of
the Ross footnote have caused uncertainty and confusion. 51 It is
doubtful that the Supreme Court would have pronounced a new
constitutional standard in such a cursory fashion. 52 This lack of clar
use of a master to assist the jury under FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b), it would indeed be a
rare case in which complexity would require a nonjury trial. 369 U.S. at 478.
47. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
48. Id. at 538 n.lO (emphasis added).
49. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 898, 903 (1979).
50. See Wolfram, supra note 22, at 644. Traditionally, the relative abilities of
judge and jury did not influence the classification of a suit as legal or equitable. "At
no time in history was the line dividing equity from law ... the product of a rational
choice between issues which were better suited to court or to a jury trial." F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.2, at 356 (2d ed. 1977).
The one exception was an action for an accounting in which the judge would
consider the abilities of a jury. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
51. Since the Court failed to apply the third prong of the test in deciding the
case, it left the courts with little guidance as to the application and meaning of
"practical abilities and limitations."
52. One commentator stated that "the footnote is so cursory, conclusory and de
void of cited authority or reasoned analysis that it is difficult to believe it could have
been intended to reject such established historical practice or Supreme Court prece
dent." Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study of the Irrationality
of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486, 526 (1975).
Recent seventh amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court also cast doubt
upon the viability of the Ross footnote as strong precedent in future seventh amend
ment adjudication. The Court, despite many opportunities to do so, has not cited the
. Ross footnote as authority in subsequent cases. For example, in Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189 (1974) and Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), the Court's
decision to grant the right to jury trial was made without any reference to the Ross
footnote. See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S: 322 (1979); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).

1981]

JURY TRIALS IN COMPLEX LITIGATION

555

ity, however, has not prevented four district courts from using
various interpretations of the Ross footnote to strike jury trial de
mands in complex cases where legal claims were asserted. 53 In In
re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation,54 the court concluded that
the footnote rests upon the due process requirement of fairness in
the resolution of all civil cases. 55 In Bernstein v. United Pictures,
Inc. ,56 the court held that, although the first two criteria favored a
finding that a jury trial should be granted, the third criterion,
standing alone, was sufficient to deny an otherwise valid claim to a
jury trial. 57 The court stated that it is the "practical abilities and
limitations of the jurors . . . that cause the court to conclude that
the issues in this case must be considered to be equitable. "58
The use of the third criteria of the Ross footnote as the
overriding factor in determining the right to jury trial in complex
litigation has not been followed by all courtS. 59 In In re United
States Financial Securities Litigation,60 the Ninth Circuit refused
to raise the test's third factor to "constitutional dimensions."61 The
court doubted that the Supreme Court would announce such a rad
ical departure from the historical test in a footnote. 62 The court
concluded that the right to jury trial is determined by the nature of
the issue to be tried and not by the complexity or character of the
overall action. 63 In the Ninth Circuit the right to jury trial depends
53. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (supple
mental memomndum decision and order); In re United States Financial Sec. Litiga
tion, 75 F.RD. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.O.
Wash. 1976).
54. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.O. Wash. 1976).
55. 420 F. Supp. at 104.
56. 79 F.RD. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). A similar approach was used by the Court in
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
57. 79 F.RD. at 69.
58. Id. at 70.
59. Some courts have relied on the first two criteria and have ignored the pmc
tical limitations and abilities test. See, e.g., Polstorff v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592
(N.D. Ala. 1977); Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 72 F.RD. 464
(M.D. Fla. 1976); Cayman Music, Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.O.
Wis. 1975). In Radial Lip Mach., Inc., v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.RD. 224
(N.D. Ill. 1977), the court held that under the Ross test, jury competence was only a
part of the threshold determination of whether an issue is legal or equitable. Id.
at 227.
60. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
61. Id. at 425.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 422.
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solely on ancient distinctions between law and equity.64 If the is
sues presented would have been considered legal at common law,
then the right to jury trial attaches, regardless of complexity. 65
Along with laying the necessary foundation for an assessment
of the merits of the due process approach, the foregoing discussion
has shown the pattern of change in seventh amendment adjudica
tion. Nowhere is this change or refinement more evident than
within the realm of the complex case. The special problem of jury
competence in these cases has induced some courts to slight the
historical test by relying upon the practical abilities an~ limitations
standard. The evolution of seventh amendment interpretation con
tinues with japanese Electronic Products. By introducing due pro
cess concerns into this interpretation, the court created a new ap
proach to use in determining the right to jury trial in complex liti
gation.
IV.

JAPANESE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS

AND THE DUE PROCESS BASIS FOR DENYING A JURY

TRIAL IN COMPLEX CASES

The court of appeals in japanese Electronic Products acknowl
edged that claims for treble damages under antitrust and anti
dumping laws clearly are legal in nature,66 and thus under the his
torical test the action would be submitted to a jury. Nonetheless,
the court held that submitting a case with the requisite degree of
complexity67 to a jury will deprive the litigants of due process. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit thus rejected
the district court's interpretation, which preserved the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial regardless of the litigation's com
plexity. The court believed that the values and principles inherent
in procedural due process should restrict some kinds of cases from
being submitted to a jury. 68 The court's approach, therefore, pro
64. Id.
65. Id. at 431.
66. 631 F.2d at 1079.
67. See note 18 supra for factors to consider in assessing a suit's complexity. It
is important to remember that in the Japanese Electronic Products decision, the
court did not make a complexity determination or deny a jury trial on complexity
grounds. 631 F.2d at 1090. The court left the issue of the complexity of the litigation
to the district court on remand. Id. Thus, the court only overturned the district
court's conclusion that a jury trial is mandated by the seventh amendment regardless
of a suit's complexity. Id. at 1086. The court believed that a litigant should be given
the opportunity to show that a suit is too complex for a jury to decide rationally be
cause of the important due process rights involved. Id.
68. Id. at 1084. No specific precedent exists for finding a due process violation
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vides that the right to a jury trial in complex litigation ultimately
must be determined by reference to the underlying values sought
to be promoted by due process.
The court was aware of the conflict it was creating. If, after an
inquiry into the factors contributing to complexity,69 it is deter
mined that a jury cannot perform its decisionmaking function in ac
cordance with the demands of due process, a conflict arises be
tween the fifth70 and the seventh amendments.71 Resolution of the
conflict, the court reasoned, entails a balancing of the two constitu
tionally protected interests within the particular context of the
complex case. 72 If the interests protected by due process are found
to outweigh the interests served by the right to jury trial, the sev
enth amendment must yield. 73
The court of appeals identified two basic interests to be safe
guarded by due process in factfinding procedures. The primary in
terest is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. 74 If a particu
lar suit is so complex that it seems certain that a jury will not be
able to understand the evidence and legal standards, the court con
cluded that the use of a jury provides no assurance that a reliable
decision will be reached. 75 Thus, when complexity prevents a jury
from making an informed and intelligent evaluation of a case, a
deprivation of due process results. 76
in submitting a case to a jury. Id. The "practical abilities and limitations of juries"
element of the Ross test seems to be in hannony with the due process argument pro
posed by the court here. See the discussion of the Boise case in notes 53 & 54 supra
and accompanying text.
69. See note 18 supra.
70. The fifth amendment provides that "no person shall ... be denied life, lib
erty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. v.
Due process applies whenever the enforcement power of the government is em
ployed to deprive a person of property, whether such property is taken to meet a
need of the government or for the benefit ·of another private person. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 509, § 10-8 (1978).
71. 631 F.2d at 1084.
72. Id.
73. [d. at 1086.
74. [d. at 1087. The Court relied upon Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), in which the Court announced something akin to a general fonnula to deter
mine whether the use of a particular procedure violates due process of law. The
Court held that due process requires consideration of three factors: First, the private
interest affected; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests
through the procedures used and the value of additional or substitute procedures;
and finally, the government's interest, including the financial burdens that the addi
tional or substitute procedures would entail. [d. at 335.
75. 631 F.2d at 1084.
76. [d.
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Due process also protects the guarantee that a jury will be
able to arrive at its decision in an appropriate manner and by ra
tional means. 77 Due process "does not contemplate scientific preci
sion but does contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of
a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and rea
sonable application of the relevant legal rules. "78 If a jury cannot
do this, it seems reasonable to conclude that its decision will not
be reached by rational means. Accordingly, the court reasoned that
the seventh amendment does not mandate a jury trial when a suit's
complexity prevents a jury from gaining a fair understanding of the
evidence and from rationally applying the legal rules. 79
The court asserted that the due process requirement of a com
petent decisionmaking body "implicates values of fundamental im
portance. "80 If the jury cannot understand the evidence and the le
gal rules, it will not be able to make factual and legal deter
minations with a dependable degree of accuracy. The court feared
that jury confusion would tend to undermine the ability of a dis
trict court to render just decisions since legal remedies might not
be applied in accordance with the purposes and policies of the
law. 81 Furthermore, jury verdicts would be erratic, inconsistent,
and unpredictable, frustrating any attempt by the courts to provide
evenhanded justice. 82
77. Id. at 1079.
78. Id. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (due process requires a compe
tent tribunal and a jury capable of rendering a verdict based on the evidence and the
law); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("[TJhe decisionmaker's conclusion
. . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing");
Schultz v. Pennsylvania, 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956) (jurors are supposed to reach their
conclusions on the basis of evidence consisting of direct statements by witnesses or
proof of circumstances from which inferences can fairly be drawn); and Gasoline
Prod. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931) (if the jury would be
confused and uncertain in its deliberations of an issue, a denial of a fair trial would
result).
79. 631 F.2d at 1086. Aside from the possibility that a jury will simply be con
fused and overwhelmed by a mass of information and evidence that is foreign to the
average person, the court provides a second reason why a jury may not be able to de
cide the complex case rationally. The likelihood of a long trial will weed out many
jurors whose backgrounds may qualify them for deciding a complex case.. For a fuller
discussion of this constraint on the jury, see notes 159-65 infra and accompanying
text.
The court also presumed that a judge is capable of deciding a complex case. See
note 122 infra and accompanying text.
80. 631 F.2d at 1084.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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The court next assessed the interests protected by the seventh
amendment and found that the right to a jury trial does not impli
cate the same fundamental concerns as the rights protected under
procedural due process. 83 The court of appeals was unpersuaded
by the district court's assertion that the due process approach fails
to take into account the special benefits that juries bring to the liti
gation process. The court of appeals contended that the benefits as
sociated with the use of juries are not present to any substantial
degree in a complex case. 84 For example, the district court empha
sized the jury's unique ability to render its decision without opin
ion or justification. 85 This allows the jury to modify the law by in
terjecting community sentiment into its decision;86 thus, the jury
prevents harsh results that may be mandated by a strict application
of the law. The district court asserted that the jury's power to give
results without reasons was especially advantageous in complex
cases where verdicts often are reached by determinations of degree
or by line drawing. 87 Although this practice is considered arbitrary
by some,88 the process is somehow legitimized when it is con
ducted by a body representing the community. Regardless, the
court of appeals indicated that the jury's ability to modify the law
in accordance with community sentiment is valueless when the
jury is unable to understand the normal application of the law to
the facts in the first instance. 89 When a jury is unable to under
stand the facts or to apply the law to the facts, the jury will reach
its decision on the basis of its own perception of community values,
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1085.
85. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 889, 938-39 (E.D. Pa.
1979). A general verdict allows a jury to render a decision without opinion or justifi
cation. All the jury need do to render a general verdict is to announce which party
has won and, if it is the plaintiff, the amount of his recovery.
86. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 49.05, at 2217 (2d ed. 1980) in which
it is stated:
[T]he general verdict, at times, achieves a triumph of justice over law.
The jury is not, nor should it become, a scientific fact finding body. Its chief
value is that it applies the 'law,' oftentimes a body of technical and refined
theoretical principles and sometimes edged with harshness, in an earthy
fashion that comports with· 'justice' as conceived by the masses, for whom
after all the law is mainly meant to serve.
See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); Broeder, The Functions of the
Jury Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 411 (1954).
87. 478 F. Supp. at 941. See generally Holmes, Law in Science and Science in
Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 457 (1899).
88. Holmes, supra note 87, at 457.
89. 631 F.2d at 1085.
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not by a conscious and deliberate modification of legal rules. 90
This, the court stated, is not more than "unprincipled decision
making."91
The court of appeals was equally unpersuaded by the district
court's argument that the jury should be preserved in complex civil
litigation because it provides a needed check on judicial power. 92 If
a jury cannot comprehend the evidence and the legal rules, the
court reasoned that the jury itself would be the equivalent of an ar
bitrary judicial power, the very evil it was intended to check. 93
The court of appeals provided further support for its argument
that denial of a jury trial in complex litigation does not implicate
fundamental concerns, such as those protected by procedural due
process. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court has refused
to include the civil jury trial as an essential element of ordered lib
erty; thus, the right to jury trial in civil matters has not been incor
porated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend
ment. 94 Implicit in the Supreme Court's refusal to categorize the
civil jury trial as a fundamental right is the view that a judge can
render basic justice without the aid of a jury. 95

90. Id. The federal rules provide a safeguard against the possibility that a jury
will render its decision wholly on its conception of community values without regard
to the evidence presented. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a) allows the court to use a special ver
dict, in which case the jury must submit a special written finding upon each issue of
fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b) allows the court to issue forms for a general verdict to the
jury. The forms are accompanied by interrogatories which require the jury to answer
specific questions concerning issues of fact important to a verdict. Both these proce
dures compel the jury to consider the factual basis of the litigation.
91. 631 F.2d at 1085.
92. Id. (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Litigation, 478 F. Supp. at 942). See
Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial
Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 58-60 (1977).
93. 631 F.2d at 1085.
94. Id. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court stated that the
right to trial by jury may have value and importance. Id. at 325. To abolish trials by
jury, however, is not to violate a principle of justice so rooted in tradition as to be
ranked as fundamental. "Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a
fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them." Id.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and an essential ele
ment of ordered liberty. Id. at 149 .
. 95. The court buttressed this argument by pointing out that the requirement of
bench trials in equitable and maritime actions proves that judges are capable of pro
viding fair and just trials. 631 F.2d at 1086-87.
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DEPARTURE CONTINUES: ASSESSING THE
DUE PROCESS ApPROACH

The due process approach to determine the right to a jury trial
represents a dramatic departure from the historical test. After a
careful inquiry into whether a case is so complex that it precludes
rational decisionmaking by a jury, a court would balance the con
flicting interests to decide whether the use of a jury would pro
mote fairness and justice. By bringing into the forefront of seventh
amendment interpretation these policy judgments as to the advisa~
bility, fairness, and appropriateness of submitting a particular kind
of case to a jury for resolution, the court in Japanese Electronic
Products departed completely from the historically recognized dis
tinction between law and equity as the litmus test for determining
the right to jury trial. 96 The present inquiry thus focuses upon jury
competence rather than upon fine distinctions between law and eq
uity formulated by courts at the time the seventh amendment was
adopted.
The court of appeals' rejection of the historical test is justi
fiable. The changing character of contemporary litigation could not
have been anticipated by the framers of the seventh amendment or
by the judges who sat on the English courts of chancery. -Reliance
upon policies that existed almost two hundred years ago to resolve
the present problem of jury use in complex civil litigation, there
fore, is inappropriate. Moreover, the courts should not rely upon
historical distinctions between law and equity since that approach
will impede the development of other methods to resolve the
complex-case problem facing the federal courts. For example, the
district court in Japanese Electronic Products held that the right to
jury trial depends solely upon the distinction between law and eq
uity: no complexity exception to the seventh amendment was rec
ognized. If all courts applied this simplistic distinction between law
and equity, they could ignore the problems that complex litigation
creates in terms of a jury's ability to render rational and fair deci
sions. If the claims asserted in a complex case are legal in nature, a
jury trial would be ordered regardless of the degree of a suit's com
96. The due process approach makes any inquiry into historical distinctions be
tween law and equity unnecessary. [d. at 1083. In this way, the approach is a sharper
departure from the historical test than the inquiry suggested under the Ross footnote.
Under a strict reading of the footnote, an inquiry into the pre-merger custom of
common-law courts is required.
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plexity and the potential danger of an irrational verdict. Con
versely, the due process approach squarely addresses the problem.
By recognizing due process concerns, the due process approach
forces courts to focus upon the development of alternatives to rem
edy the problem of irrational decisionmaking by a jury. The court
of appeals in Japanese Electronic Products looked for alternative
solutions and suggested that courts try severance or other proce
dures to reduce the complexity of suits. By making lawsuits under
standable, jury trials need not be denied. 97
Thus, to the extent that the due process approach allows the
federal courts flexibility in determining the fairness of submitting a
complex case to a jury, free from the shackles of the historical test,
it represents a more realistic and effective approach to resolution of
the problem.
.
VI.
A.

ANALYSIS

Implications of the Decision
1.

Scope of the Due Process Approach

Critics of the due process approach might argue that case-by
case determination of complexity eventually will dilute the right to
jury trial in all civil suits98 since irrational verdicts are possible in
all cases,99 not just in complex ones. Strict application of the due
process requirement that courts minimize the risks of erroneous
decisions suggests that judges make a comparison between their
ability to render rational decisions and the jury's ability to do so.
If a judge considers himself to be a more capable decisionmaker,
which his experience and expertise may lead him to believe, a lit
eral reading of the standard suggests that a nonjury trial should be
97. Id. at 1088. The court provided little guidance or meaningful discussion of
the application of these procedures. For a fuller discussion of possible methods of
reducing complexity and for a recommended approach to the application of Various
procedures, such as separate trials and masters, see text accompanying notes 127-58
infra.
98. The fear that the due process approach will lead to the long run dilution of
the right to jury trial was expressed by the district court in In re Japanese Elec.
Prod. Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 889, 932-33 (E.D. Pa. 1979) and by the court in Radial
Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228 (N.D. III. 1977).
99. Procedures allowing for directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding
the verdict (J.N.O.V.) are safeguards against irrational jury decisions and are a recog
nition of the fact that irrational verdicts may occur. For a fuller discussion of devices
for controlling a jury, see F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 249-336 (1965).
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ordered. This would minimize the risks of an erroneous decision. If
the courts interpret the due process approach in this way in the fu
ture, the approach will invite a loosely defined and discretionary
jury trial determination in all civil cases: a judge's decision that a
jury lacks the sophistication to decide a case rationally, or that his
ability outweighs that of the jury, will allow him to strike a jury
trial demand. Such an interpretation would, indeed, be tantalizing
to a judge who harbored unarticulated hostilities toward the jury
system.
Undoubtedly there is room for exercising discretion in the ap
plication of the due process approach,lOo but a reading of the
court's approach suggesting that it will lead to the eventual dilution
of the right to a jury trial sweeps much too broadly. Rather, the
decision actually reinforces the position of the jury within the
broad spectrum of contemporary civil litigation. The court of ap
peals simply has carved out a very limited exception to the right to
jury trial. It can be employed only in exceptional cases when the
court, after inquiry into the factors contributing to complexity,101
determines that a jury cannot decide the case rationally.102 A liti
gant may not be denied a jury trial merely because the judge pre
fers a nonjury trial to a jury trial. Instead, it must be evident that a
suit's complexity will preclude rational decisionmaking in accor
dance with the requirements of procedural due process. 103 The
court of appeals in Japanese Electronic Products did not consider
the civil jury to be a dispensable part of the litigation process in
the vast majority of civil suits, nor did the court demean the valu
able contributions made by juries in civil cases. It merely con
cluded that the benefits of a jury could not be realized in a suit
considered to be too complex for a jury to decide rationally: al
lowing or requiring a party to try his case before a jury in a suit
containing all the elements of complexity would not, in effect, pre
serve the right to jury trial as that right is commonly perceived or
understood.
The due process approach presented in Japanese Electronic
Products, therefore, will have no effect upon jury trial rights out
side the sphere of complex litigation. By limiting the standard to
suits where both complexity and jury competence problems clearly
are evident, its scope is limited sufficiently.
100.
101.
102.
103.

The court recognized the problem of discretion. 631 F.2d at 1088-89.
See note 18 supra.
631 F.2d at 1089.
Id.
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Problem of Judicial Discretion

The court of appeals' approach to seventh amendment adjudi
cation in Japanese Electronic Products does not equip federal
judges with enough discretion to enable them to dilute the right to
jury trial in noncomplex civil cases. The discretion that they can
exercise within the realm of complex litigation, however, does
present some potential problems.
The court attempted to objectify and to clarify the factors to
be used to determine whether a case is too complex for jury deter
mination. 104 The dissent recognized, however, that applying the
factors permits the court to exercise a substantial amount of discre
tion,105 a situation that gives rise to three potential problems.
First, the judicial attitude concerning the abilities of juries un
doubtedly will vary from circuit to circuit and from judge to
judge. lOS Moreover, each judge's viewpoint as to the competency
of a jury in complex civil litigation will affect his decision as to
whether a suit has sufficient elements of complexity to warrant a
nonjury trial on due process grounds. 107 The obvious problem with
determining the right to a jury trial through a case-by-case inquiry
into complexity, therefore, is its lack of predictability. Because the
outcome under the complexity test will depend upon a subjective
view of jury competence, an inherently discretionary decision, a to
tal lack of uniformity among the circuits could result. For example,
under a case-by-case inquiry into complexity a litigant might have a
right to jury trial in one circuit but not in another. This result is
not sound. Every effort should be made to assure, to the fullest ex
tent practicable, that express provisions in the Bill of Rights be
uniformly and evenhandedly applied from circuit to circuit.
A second problem with the discretion afforded under the case
by-case approach to complexity is demonstrated by what the dis
sent considered to be its most serious difficulty with the majority
opinion. Judge Gibbons stated: "I fear that the exercise of that dis
104. See note 18 supra.
105. 631 F.2d at 1093. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
106. Compare In re Japanese Electronic Products, 478 F. Supp. at 935-38 with
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978) and
In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104.
107. For example, a judge who has a relatively low opinion of jury ability may
be more inclined in borderline cases to conclude that a suit is too complex for a jury
to decide rationally. Conversely, a judge with a high opinion of jury ability may be
less inclined to conclude that a suit is sufficiently complex to warrant striking a jury
trial demand.
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cretion will sometimes be influenced by unarticulated sympathies
for or hostilities toward the underlying policies sought to be ad
vanced in the lawsuit.''108 Judge Gibbons apparently was con
cerned about the danger that a judge might deny a jury trial de
mand when he has a strong desire to interpose his sentiments and
judgments into the policy issues sought to be resolved. For exam
ple, a judge who harbors strong opinions on race relations may
deny a jury trial in a complex civil rights case so that he, as the ul
timate decisionmaker, may impose his values and opinions on the
outcome of the litigation. 109
The danger that a judge might make a finding of complexity
and deny a jury trial for ulterior motives is insignificant in a com
plex antitrust case or other commercial lawsuit when the parties
are large, multinational corporations carrying on a form of eco
nomic warfare in the courts. In contrast, however, an antitrust suit
brought by the United States Government against a corporation
has fundamental political and economic overtones concerning the
issue of governmental intervention into the private sector of the
economy. Similarly, in other kinds of complex litigation, such as
those involving environmental law and civil rights, strong and emo
tional public policy judgments are an integral part of the litigation
and often are decisive of the outcome. 110 The discretion to order a
nonjury trial in such cases may, at the very least,be enticing to a
judge. who has strong preferences either for or against the public
policy advanced in the lawsuit. 111
A third but closely related difficulty associated with the discre
108. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
109. A strong counterargument can be made that a judge need not dispense
with the jury in order to bring his biases to bear on the outcome of the litigation.
The judge's power to make rulings on evidence and to control the proceedings may
be sufficient to allow him to steer the outcome of the litigation despite the presence
of the jury as decision maker.
1l0. See, e.g., Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977)
(policy of Endangered Species Act of 1973 warranted the termination of $100 million
dam project in which millions of tax dollars had already been expended); West Va.
Div. of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1975) (policy of the Organic Act to conserve federal woodlands outweighed the pol
icy of exploiting national forests to meet the rising demand for lumber).
lli. One commentator has pointed out that providing judges with the power to
deny jury trials in cases in which juries may not be able to perform their fact finding
duties seems to run counter to the jury function of limiting the power of judges. The
power to deny a jury trial provides judges with discretionary authority to determine
whether this check on their powers should be imposed. See Wolfram, supra note 132
at 644.
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tion afforded a judge is that his decision may be unreviewable. 112
The japanese Electronic Products majority opinion concluded that
any erroneous denial of a jury trial can be remedied prior to trial
by a writ of mandamus from a court of appeals. 113 Such a device,
as the dissent pointed out, very rarely will lead to a reversal of an
order to strike a jury demand. 114 When the reviewing court applies
the criteria used to determine complexity, it probably will con
clude that the trial court acted within the bounds of its broad dis
cretion. The dissent also accords little significance to a posttrial
plea that a jury trial was denied erroneously.u5 Taking into consid
eration the strain and burden that complex cases impose upon the
time and resources of the federal courts, "the pressures on an ap
pellate tribunal not to order a retrial of an otherwise error-free trial
in a complex case will ... inevitably be irresistible. "116

B.

Eliminating the jury: Has Rational Decisionmaking
Been Assured?
The court of appeals in japanese Electronic Products indicated
that its goal was to assure that complex suits are resolved fairly and
rationally in accordance with the principles inherent in procedural
due process. 117 The merit of the due process approach lies in its
concern with the quality of justice rendered rather than with ad
herence to archaic and rigid principles and distinctions. It seems
reasonable to conclude that jurors in a complex and protracted suit
may not be able to achieve the goals of fairness and justice. Some
civil cases are so enormous that they will virtually overwhelm -the
jury. The language of the complex case is often foreign to the aver
age juror. The concepts that a juror is required to grasp within a
relatively short period of time probably have taken those adept in
the particular field years to master. us The juror in a complex case
631 F.Zd at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Id.
117. Id.atI084.
118. In Japanese Electronic Products, for example, the jury may have to review
the technical features of thousands of different models and understand how differ
ences between the models relate to cost of manufacturing, product performance, and
marketability. The jury also will have to decide whether the price of Japanese goods
sold in the United States is substantially less than the actual market value in Japan.
This will require the jury to factor currency fluctuations and different marketing
techniques between the two countries. Id. In Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 555 F.Zd 1379
lIZ.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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can aptly be described as "a stranger in a strange land. "119 In addi
tion, the juror must digest and assimilate a tremendous volume of
evidence. 120
The alternative to a lay jury, however, is a lay judge. Although
a jury may be inexperienced and unaccustomed to the technical
features of a case, there is no real assurance that a judge will be
any more familiar with such matters. In short, a judge may labor
under the same conceptual difficulties. The Japanese Electronic
Products court recognized thiS. 121 Nevertheless, the court con
cluded that a judge's ability to digest a large amount of evidence,
to apply legal standards to the facts, and to understand the process
of civil litigation makes it reasonable to presume that a judge is ca
pable of deciding a complex case. 122
The court's argument has merit; but, by focusing exclusively
upon the judge's ability to decide a complex case, it fails to take
into consideration the difficulties confronting a judge in a nonjury
trial. An important function of the litigants which helps to assure
that a complex case will be decided rationally is the organization of
the mass of information into a comprehensible form. The process of
organizing and presenting a large volume of evidence in a form
that is comprehensible to the uninitiated may suffer in a nonjury
trial since it is the presence of a lay jury that forces a "fierce disci
pline" upon the litigants to distill the information and.to clarify the
issues. 123 In addition, the evidentiary rules are relaxed in a
nonjury trial on the assumption that a judge will consider only ad
missible evidence. Without exacting rules, however, the issues and
the proof may not be presented as clearly as they must be if a ra
tional disposition of a complex case is to be attained. 124
(9th Cir. 1977) the jury was asked to determine whether one of IBM's most sophisti
cated computers performed as promised. The jury was also asked to consider the en
gineering validity of IBM's computer design and to make a connection between
some of its components and IBM's data storage machines. See Schaffer, Those Com
plex Antitrust Cases, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 16, col. 4.
119. Schaffer, supra note 107, at 16, col. 4.
120. See note 2 supra. The discovery process in Japanese Electronic Products
produced over 100,000 pages of depositions and over 1,000,000 documents. 631 F.2d
at 1073.
121. Id. at 1087.
122. Id. The court in In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at
104-05, stated that the judge's ability to review daily transcripts and reporter notes,
to study exhibits in depth, and to carry on colloquies with witnesses, makes him
more capable than a jury to comprehend complicated facts.
123. Higginbotham, supra note 92 at 54.
124. Id.
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Whether a judge or a jury is more competent is an issue that
has divided, and probably will continue to divide, the federal
courtS. 125 The conclusion that enormous and complex' suits impose
a heavy burden upon the factfinding body, however, is undisputed.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that either a judge or a jury can
rationally and competently decide such cases in light of their pres
ent form and magnitude. 126 Perhaps procedures that focus on
reducing the size and dimension of the suits should be used to deal
with the problem of complex litigation. By reducing the size and
complexity .of a suit, these procedures will also provide the courts
with a method of preserving both the right to jury trial and proce
dural due process.

VII.

AVOIDING A FATAL CLASH: PRESERVING

JURY TRIAL RIGHTS AND RATIONAL DECISIONMAKING

A cardinal principle of constitutional adjudication is that the
courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions. 127 Deciding a
constitutional question is legitimate only as a last resort.128 In ac
cordance with this principle, the courts should seek to promote the
interests implicit in the fifth and seventh amendments by at
tempting to mitigate the conflict between the two provisions. Ev
ery effort should be made to employ devices and procedures that
will allow the two provisions to coexist. If the two amendments can
be reconciled in this way, preserving the interests protected under
both, the drastic solution of abrogating the right to jury trial need
not be employed.
.
A.

Reducing Conceptual Difficulties

A court confronted with a complexity challenge to a jury trial
should use efficient procedures and sound judicial management to
help to improve jury comprehension. Judges should resort to the
Manual of Complex Litigation,129 which provides a collection of
procedures that can be used to aid the jury in its understanding of
the case. Two procedures suggested by the Manual may be partic

125. For an indication of the difference between the circuits, see the cases
cited in note 106 supra.
126. See note 156 infra.
127. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION (1978).
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ularly helpful in improving jury comprehension: Masters and the
pretrial conference.
When a court foresees a problem with the jury's ability to de
cide a technical, factual dispute, it can refer the dispute to a spe
cial master under rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure. 130 The master is empowered to call a meeting, to hear
witnesses, and to file a report containing findings of fact and con
clusions of law when requested to do so by the court. 131 The re
port of the master, however, does not free the jury from making
factual determinations upon technical issues. Instead, the report is
merely admissible evidence that the jury can either accept or re
ject. 132 Nevertheless, the master's report is useful for the purposes
of clarifYing the facts and issues and giving the jury a clearer un
derstanding of technical evidence. 133
In a less direct way, pretrial conferences can playa vital role
in making a complex case more understandable to a lay jury. Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to
conduct a pretrial conference to consider, among other things, the
simplification and identification of issues. 134 Streamlining the com
plex case by defining and simplifying the issues will help the jury
to understand the nature of the dispute and also limit the scope of
discovery to pertinent information. 13s In addition to these proce
dural functions, the pretrial conference also should be used to ac
130. See United States v. IBM, 76 F.RD. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bercovici. v.
Chaplin, 3 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (difficulty of trying issues to a jury may be
overcome by reference to a master).
131. The power and duties of a master are completely dependent upon the
court's order of reference. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b), (c). Consequently, the master has
the power to find facts and reach conclusions of law only if specifically authorized
by the order of reference. Moreover, reference may be granted in a jury trial only
when issues are complicated. FED. R CIV. P. 53(b).
132. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2604, at 782-83.
133. The most common argument against the use of a master concerns expense
and delay. See Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d
809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942) (matter of common knowledge that reference to a master
greatly increases the cost of litigation).
For a fuller discussion of masters, see Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts:
Rille 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1958); Comment, Masters and Magistrates in the
Federal COllrts, 88 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1975).
134. See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 F.RD. 3, 7-8 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
135. Allowing discovery to commence without a clear conception of relevancy
and materiality will lead only to the confusion of the judge, of counsel and, ulti
mately, of the jury. For a discussion of the way in which pretrial conferences can
limit discovery, see 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER; supra note 21, § 1530, at 624-29.
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commodate the special needs of a jury in a complex case. Judge
and counsel should make a special effort to assure that issues are
presented to a jury in an understandable manner. Consideration
should be given to methods and techniques of presenting informa
tion that will clarify the issues for the jury. 136
Procedural devices such as the pretrial conference and the em
ployment of masters, although useful in preventing jury confusion,
are not panaceas. If complex litigation is viewed on a continuum
with the least complex cases at the beginning and the most com
plex cases at the end, the devices considered thus far may assist
the jury in rendering a rational decision in those cases at the be
ginning of the continuum. These devices, however, may not be
sufficient to assure rational decisionmaking in cases having greater
degrees of complexity. In such cases, more fundamental adjust
ments may be necessary to preserve both jury trial rights and pro
cedural due process guarantees.

B.

Making the Case Manageable

Japanese Electronic Products is a complex case. 137 Each sepa
rate claim standing alone, however, was not sufficiently complex to
preclude rational decisionmaking by a jury. Instead, the complexity
in Japanese Electronic Products 138 was caused by the parties' utili
zation of the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 139 By joining multiple claims and parties, the suit fell
out of the purview of the jury.
The modem joinder rules are extremely liberal, allowing join
der of practically "any claim or any party. . . . "140 The ultimate
goal of the joinder rules is to promote court efficiency and judicial
economy and to expedite resolution of all related claims. To the ex
tent that the liberal joinder rules and the rule permitting consoli
136. For a general discussion of pretrial management of complex cases, see
Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1976); Staff Paper, The Early Narrowing and Resolution of Is
sues, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1041 (1980).
137. See note 118 supra.
138. Other civil cases in which a nonjury trial was ordered on complexity
grounds are ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.RD. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.RD. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd 609
F.2d at 411; In re Boise Cascade Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 99.
139. 631 F.2d at 1091, (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See FED. R CIY. P. 18, 19, 20,
22,23, & 42(a).
140. Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36
MINN. L. REV. 580, 581 (1952).
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dation 141 have eliminated duplication of effort and have saved judi
cial time and resources, they have proven to be of unquestionable
value. As one commentator points out, however, "procedures can
not be 'good' or 'bad' in isolation, without relation to their con
text. "142 Accordingly, despite their utility in preventing piecemeal
adjudication, the rules permitting joinder and consolidation should
be applied with an awareness of the practical problems they can
create. While the court may be concerned with efficiency, joinder
and consolidation may result in the creation of an unwieldy trial
beyond the comprehension of a jury or even a judge.
1.

A Seventh Amendment Limitation

Since complexity is largely the product of the courts' resort to
both the joinder rules and the rule permitting consolidation, the
courts' utilization of these rules, in effect, may preclude a litigant
from enjoying his seventh amendment right to jury trial. A serious
question arises regarding the extent to which a court should be al
lowed to create the complexity that makes a jury trial impossible in
light of the requirements of due process.
The seventh amendment can be read to impose a limitation
upon the power of a court to order joinder of claims and parties
and consolidation of actions if these procedural devices remove the
case from the purview of the jury. The joinder rules and the rule
permitting consolidation are statutory grants of discretionary
power. They are not mandated by any provision of the Constitu
tion. The right to jury trial, however, is established and protected
by the seventh amendment. Thus, construing the seventh amend
ment as placing a limitation upon the court's use of joinder and
consolidation seems inescapable. To hold otherwise would be to as
sert that a statutory, discretionary power can prevent the exercise
of a constitutional privilege embodied in the Bill of Rights. Judge
Gibbons, in his dissent, indicated that the seventh amendment
does place limitations on joinder and consolidation: "[i]f by virtue
of joinder and consolidation a case becomes too complex for a
single jury to handle, the remedy mandated by the seventh
amendment is separate juries, as at common law. "143
FED. R. Cry. P. 42(a).
Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote Justice that is
Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971).
143. 631 F.2d at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated that a de
fendant insisting on a jury trial must be willing to insist that the plaintiff separate his
141.
142.
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The constitutional question of whether a judge is required by
the seventh amendment either to refrain from ordering joinder or
consolidation or to separate into its component parts a suit con
taining multiple claims and parties, however, can be avoided. The
federal rules provide a safeguard against the creation of a suit so
complex that it may be beyond jury comprehension.
2.

Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a court may order a separate trial of any claim or issue "in fur
therance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy. . . . "144 The
judge's discretionary power to order separate trials under the rule
is extremely broad. 145 Thus, when a party moves to strike a de
mand for a jury trial on complexity grounds, the judge can order
separate trials. The judge thereby reduces the complexity of a suit
sufficiently to bring it within the realm of jury competence. 146
Charles Alen Wright, a distinguished scholar of civil procedure,
stated that "the only valid way to handle the problem is to say that
it is desirable to include as many claims and parties as there are in
one suit, except where this may make the suit too many-sided and
complicated for the jury to unravel. . . . "147 By follOwing this ap
proach, a court, by reducing the size of the litigation, could pre
serve rational decisionmaking and the right to jury trial.
The technique of ordering separate trials on the ground that
the issues are too complicated and numerous to be resolved in a
single trial has been used successfully by many courts. In Reines
Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 148 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the inherent
complexity of an antitrust case is a factor to be weighed in the
judge's decision whether to order a separate trial of an issue. 149 If
case into its components. A plaintiff insisting on a jury trial likewise must forego his
use of the liberal joinder rules if such joinder makes the case too complex for a
single jury. Id.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
145. See United States v. 1,071.08 Acres of Land, 564 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir.
1977) (district court has broad discretion to order separate trials; exercise of that dis
cretion will be set aside only if clearly abused).
146. When a court decides to order a separate trial of an issue or action, a sepa
rate jury also will be provided.
147. See Wright, supra note 140, at 581.
148. 257 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
149. Id. at 621.
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the result of the separate trial would be to simplify the litigation,
the court reasoned that separation should be ordered. 150 In Read
ing Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 151 the same court
ordered separate trials to avoid confusing the jury since the jury
would have had to assimilate the economic conditions of an entire
industry and understand the relevant markets of various prod
ucts.1 52 In Henan Oil Tools, Inc. v. Engineering Enterprises,
Inc. ,153 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas stated that the burden placed on the trier of fact, whether
judge or jury, in complex antitrust cases entailing vast amounts of
evidence and a protracted trial, is a heavy one to bear. The court
reasoned that the present litigation came precisely within the au
thorization of rule 42(b).154
Thus, a counterbalance to the liberal joinder and consolidation
rules is built into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent
the creation of unmanageable litigation and jury confusion. 155 Rule
42(b) be a very flexible and useful procedure to preserve jury trial
rights. In addition, breaking a complex case down to a manageable
size also may be the best way to provide justice to the litigants. 156

150. Id. at 621-22.
151. 61 F.R.D. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
152. Id. at 665.
153. 262 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
154. Id. at 631. See also United States v. 1,071.08 Acres of Land, 564 F.2d
1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (lower court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sepa
rate trials when issues were sufficiently divergent to confuse a single jury); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 106 F. Supp. 561, 577 (1952) (claims will be
separately tried in order to avoid the overwhelming burden imposed by a single trial
of all the issues); Sporn v. Hudson Transit Lines, 265 App. Div. 360, 361-62, 38
N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (1942) (avoidance of multiplicity of suits is ml1ch desired, but
cause of action should be severed when such a rule might result in prejudice and
tend to confuse the jury).
For a general discussion of FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b), see Tone & Eovaldi, Separa
tion of Trials and Appeals ill Multiparty Actions, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 224; Note, Sepa
rate Trial of Claim or Issue ill Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1955).
155. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, § 2387, at 278. If, however, a
judge refuses to order separate trials in a complex case, a litigant who wishes to pre
serve his right to jury trial could argue that the seventh amendment mandates that
separate trials be ordered.
156. Consider the following comment: "These 'disputes' often approach the
scale of internecine economic wars .... Advocates that believe that such behemoth
cases are actually being tried to a court in any traditional sense are either naive ...
or ... deluding themselves about the efficacy of a bench trial." Higginbotham, supra
note 92, at 54. See also S. Riflcind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70
F.R.D. 96, 108 (1976).
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When separate trials are ordered to simplify a case, however, a
conflict develops between the policy of promoting judicial economy
and the interest in preserving trial by jury. Strong policy argu
ments support both sides of the conflict. The federal courts already
.are overburdened by complex and protracted litigation, and sepa
rate trials with separate juries may increase the burden greatly.
Those who consider efficiency to be of the utmost importance may
contend that the jury should be bypassed to help maintain a more
economical system. 157 The dissent in Japanese Electronic Products
cogently states the opposing argument: "the provisions of the Bill
of Rights which limit the way in which the federal courts conduct
their business are designed to promote values other than effi
ciency."158 Moreover, jury trials are mandated by the Constitution;
efficiency is not.
Since the success of each procedure employed to reduce com
plexity depends upon the degree of a particular suit's complexity,
no single procedure will work in all cases. Dividing a suit into sep
arate claims and parties, each heard by its own jury, in the vast
majority of complex cases will bring the case within the purview of
each jury to decide. Rule 42(b) , however, is not a perfect solution.
It is merely another important step in the process of trying to af
ford the parties due process and to preserve jury trial rights. If one
plaintiff brings a single claim against one defendant, or if a case is
broken down into its separate components and the separate claim
is still too complex for decision by a jury, a more fundamental ad
justment of the litigation process would be necessary. In this ex
ceptionally rare but not inconceivable case, the special jury might
best accommodate the litigants' right to a jury trial and to proce
dural due process. Our present jury selection process, however, is
incapable of empanelling a jury competent to handle those rare
cases when the litigants' constitutional rights would not be pro
tected by the procedural devices previously discussed.

157. In In re Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd
609 F.2d at 411, the court stated that if the 18 cases were tried separately, the cases
would be staggered over a 12 to 18 year period because many critical parts of the
proof were the same and would have to come from the same witnesses. The court
concluded that it would be unfair to require the litigants to wait this long for the
case to be decided. Id. at 714.
158. 631 F.2d at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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Improving jury Composition: Special juries as the Final Step
1.

The Nature of the Present Problem

The japanese Electronic Products court's conclusion that a jury
may be incompetent to decide a complex case was based on the
premise that the jury selection procedures, when used in pro
tracted litigation, operate to empanel a jury lacking requisite back
ground, intelligence, and technical skill to reach a rational deci
sion. 159 The disproportionate exclusion of jurors who are best able
to decide a complex case can be attributed in part to the wide dis
cretion that the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968160 gives a
judge in determining whether to excuse a potential juror. 161 The
Act simply provides that a juror "may be . . . excused by the
court, upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconven
ience. "162 No meaningful or stringent guidelines are established
under the statute concerning what constitutes undue hardship or
extreme inconvenience. l63 Consequently, most courts in complex
litigation have accommodated potentially competent jurors who al
lege undue hardships or extreme inconvenience by excusing
them. 164 One court stated that "It would be unconscionable to de
159. Id. at 1086. This problem has been noted by other courts. See ILC Periph
erals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v.
United Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 69-70; In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420
F. Supp. at 104.
160. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1861-1875 (1976).
161. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 126 (1977).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1976). The statute also requires that federal courts
"specify those groups of persons or occupational class whose members shall on indi
vidual requests be excused from jury service" and those groups barred from jury
service due to the public importance of their work. Id. § 1863(b)(5)(6).
163. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 146, at 126. The Jury System Improvement Act
of 1978, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 18690), 1871, 1875 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 28
U.S.c. § 1861 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act] does attempt to define the
standards of undue hardship and extreme inconvenience, as a basis for excuse from
immediate jury service:
[G]reat distance, either in miles or travel-time, from the place of holding court,
grave illness in the family or any other emergency which outweighs in im
mediacy and urgency the obligation to serve as a juror when summoned, or
any other factor which the court determines to constitute an undue hardship
or to create an extreme inconvenience to the juror; ....
Id. § 1869(j). Despite this definition, by including the statement "any other factor
which the court determines to constitute undue hardship or extreme inconvenience,"
Congress has left much of the courts' discretion intact. For a fuller discussion of the
Act, see text accompanying notes 153"63 supra; text accompanying note 164 infra.
164. For example, in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423
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mand of any gainfully employed person . . . that he abandon his
ca~eer for two years. . . . [F]ew careers would not be materially
and pennanently retarded in tenns of promotions, seniority, main
tenance of professional proficiency, etc., by such a long ab
sence. "165
2.

Effects of Jury System Improvements Act

Recent legislative efforts have been directed toward improving
the composition of federal juries. The Jury System Improvements
Act of 1978166 indicates a clear legislative intent to assure litigants
of a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community.1 67 .
The Act makes one significant modification of the selection process
which may affect the composition of juries in complex cases. The
Act protects employees from intimidation, discharge, or coercion
by employers who may be hostile toward an employee's long ab
sence while he has been on jury duty. 168 The Act further guaran
tees that a juror may resume employm'ent after completion of jury
duty without the loss of seniority. The juror is treated as though he
had been on a leave of absence. 169
The purpose of this portion of the Act is clear: qualified jurors
employed in technical or professional fields should not be deterred
from jury service by fear that their absence for a long period will
jeopardize their jobs or will affect their seniority or job benefits.
Consequently, judges may be less receptive to pleas that jury duty
(N.D. CaL 1978), excuses reduced a pool of 175 prospective jurors to only 29. In
Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 555 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977), all lI8 jurors who asked to be
excused were excused. See Shaffer, supra note lI8, at 16, col. 4. In SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), a pool of 95 jurors was reduced to 36
after excuses. See Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775 (1978).
165. In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713 (S.D. CaL
1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 4lI (9th Cir. 1979). The exclusion of highly skilled and edu
cated members of the community from juries in complex cases is discussed by the
court in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. CaL
1978). The court stated that of the eleven jurors, several were housewives, one was
retired, and the remainder held jobs that could be filled by other people. Id. Only
one juror had a limited technical education. This led the court to say that the eleven
jurors "probably represented [those] people in the community who could afford to
spend 10 months serving on a jury." Id.
166. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1869(j), 1871, 1875 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (1976)).
167. H.R. REP. No. 95-1652, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] 5 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5477, 5482.
168. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1875 (1978).
169. Id.
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will cost a competent juror his employment status. This provision
alone may not result in the empanelling of a jury competent to de
cide a case that, after separate trials are ordered, contains a single
claim sufficiently complex to warrant a due process objection to a
jury trial. Although loss of a job may no longer be a problem,
many judges may continue to feel that a long absence from profes
sional or technical employment nevertheless will have a detrimen
tal effect upon career goals. 170 Furthermore, a judge simply may
believe that it is unjust and counterproductive to impose the ordeal
of lengthy jury service onto persons who do not wish to assume the
duty. Most judges recognize that forcing an unwilling juror to sit
through a lengthy trial will have an adverse effect upon the quality
of justice rendered. l71 Resentment may put such a severe strain on
the particular juror's commitment to the task of rendering a ra
tional decision that forcing such a juror to serve, no matter how
competent he may be, may do the judicial proceeding more harm
than good. 172
If after the excusal ~tage of the jury selection process the so
phisticated but unwilling juror has not been excused, the peremp
tory challenge stage of the process may result in his elimination. 173
A clever, potential juror could convey false feelings of bias or hos
tility, prompting an attorney to use a peremptory challenge to
eliminate him. 174 Moreover, many lawyers use their peremptory
170. See generally Richert, jurors' Attitude Toward jury Service, 2 JUST. SyS.
J. 233 (1977).
171. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 161, at 129.
172. George Hart, former Chief Justice of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, stated that because he does not "think that a person who
wants to be excused will make a good juror, and it would not be fair to the court, to
the litigants, or to the public to make him serve," he will excuse virtually everyone
who requests. [d. at 129.
173. The parties can exercise two types of challenges: Challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges. The challenge for cause eliminates jurors who during voir
dire demonstrate an inability to consider the case with impartiality: if some type of
bias can be shown to the satisfaction of the judge, the juror will be dismissed. No
limit is placed on the number of prospective jurors who may be challenged or dis
missed for cause.
Through the peremptory challenge prospective jurors are eliminated without ex
planation and without the judge's consent. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220
(1965). Normally the advocates are limited to three peremptory challenges. In the
case of multiparty litigation, however, a judge may allow each party to the action a
designated number of peremptory challenges not to exceed three each. See Standard
Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1973). The attorney may use
the peremptory challenge to remove a venireman who is likely to be hostile but
whose prejudice cannot be proved.
174. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 161, at 152-60.
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challenges to eliminate competent jurors who may use their educa
tion or expertise to influence less sophisticated jurors toward an
unfavorable verdict. 175
The modifications made by the Jury System Improvements
Act, therefore, will not significantly improve the composition of a
jury empanelled to decide a complex case. During the excusal
stage, judges undoubtedly will continue to use their discretion to
accommodate the unwilling juror, perhaps because forcing such a
person to serve against his will is both unfair to him and potentially
harmful to the interests of the litigants. Furthermore, the peremp
tory challenge can be exploited by a competent juror, enabling him
to shun his jury duty by a false display of bias or hostility.
Thus, a more fundamental change is in order. Although the
right to jury trial has been said to. deserve the utmost protec
tion,176 the right is not inflexible. In Ex Parte Peterson,177 Justice
Brandeis stated that the seventh amendment's command to pre
serve the right to jury trial does not require that old forms of prac
tice and procedure be retained. 178 "New devices may be used to
adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an
efficient instrument in the administration of justice. "179
3.

Special Juries

A jury composed of individuals who possess expertise in the
subject matter of the dispute may be better able to decide fairly
and rationally those rare complex cases involving facts and legal is
sues that lie beyond the competence of a lay jury even after the
case is broken down into its component partS. 180 One possible
method of selecting special juries would be to restore the "key
man" system. Under this system, a jury commissioner for a partic
ular district would consult prominent members of the community,
known as key-men, for names of individuals from the community
whose experience and background might qualify them to decide a
complex dispute. 181 The key-men consulted by the jury commis
175. Note, supra note 164, at 780-81.
176. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
177. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
178. Id. at 309.
179. I d. at 309-10.
180. Special juries were used in England at common law in complex cases
which "were of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders." Thayer,
The Jury and its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 295, 300 (1892) (citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 357 (G. Tucker ed. 1803)).
181. Until the passage of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.
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sioner would be individuals with years of experience and demon
strated prominence in the particular field that is the subject of the
dispute.
Under this special jury system at least some of the benefits as
sociated with lay juries would be preserved. For example, the spe
cial jury would maintain the traditional check on judicial power. It
would continue to allow citizens to participate in the judicial pro
cess. It would preserve the role of the jury in legitimizing the im
position of sanctions by the courtS. 182 Nevertheless, before the use
of special juries can be considered to be a viable option, some
threshold constitutional and practical problems may prevent or
frustrate any attempt to employ them.
The Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana 183 that the
American concept of a jury contemplates a jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.184 "[T]he jury [must] be a body
truly representative of the community . . . and not the organ of
any special group or class. "185 The proportionate representation of
all economic groups and social classes on a particular jury panel,
however, is not necessary.18S
Selecting jurors on the basis of competence probably will re
sult in the empanelling of a jury that is not representative of a fair
cross section of the community even though people are not inten
tionally excluded on the basis of race, sex, or social class. Such a
jury may contain a disproportionate number of white, middle-class
males since they presently dominate the technical and business
professions from which special jurors will be drawn. Consequently,
the courts may consider such a scheme unconstitutional. Moreover,
the empanelling of such a jury runs afoul of the jury function of in
terjecting into its verdict the sentiments and values of the commu
nity.
Although the constitutionality of the special jury makes its via

§ 1861 (1976), the "key man" system was used to pick federal jurors. Less than one
third of the states continue to use the system. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 161, at 86.
182. See 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) for a discussion of this par
ticular jury function.
183. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
184. [d. at 527. This principle has been codified into federal law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (1976).
185. 419 U.S. at 527. See U.S.C. § 1862 (1976) which provides: "No citizen
shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the
United States on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status."
186. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
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bility uncertain, Congress could amend the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968187 to allow the use of special juries in complex
cases in which separate trials would not reduce the complexity of a
claim sufficiently.188 Congress may feel compelled to do so in the
future for two reasons. First, Japanese Electronic Products raised
important and fundamental due process concerns that cannot be ig
nored. Second, the present jury selection system fails to empanel a
jury representing a fair cross section of the community.189
Were a special jury amendment enacted, an additional practi
cal problem still would exist: few jurors are willing to sit on a jury
for a prolonged period. The people who will be asked to serve on
special juries are precisely the people who are reluctant to serve
for long periods and who have successfully sought excusals under
the present jury selection process. In light .of this practical problem
and the constitutional objection, the feasibility of the special jury is
clouded with uncertainties. Nevertheless, the special jury is the
best option available to preserve many of the features of a jury trial
and to guarantee procedural due process when separation of issues
has failed to do so. Moreover, since such cases rarely will develop,
a departure from the cross-section standard may be justified be
cause the quality of justice is enhanced when a special jury is
used. 190

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Japanese Electronic Products involved a highly technical, volu
minous, and protracted antitrust dispute. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision brings into the forefront
of seventh amendment adjudication the issue of whether the due

187. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1861-1875 (1976).
188. An argument could be made that such an amendment is unlikely since the
intent of Congress in enacting the Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-572, 95 Stat. 2453 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976», was to assure that ju
ries be representative of a fair cross-section of the community. See notes 183-86 su
pra and accompanying text.
189. See In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104 (it must be
apparent that any jury chosen to sit on a case for six months will not be a fair cross
section of the community at large). See also ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM,
458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978) afI'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 555
F.2d 1379 (9th CiT. 1977); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 70; and
supra note 150.
190. For a more extensive discussion of the use of special juries in complex liti
gation, see Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Litigation, 89 YALE L.J.
1155 (1980). For a general discussion of special juries, see Baker, In Defense of the
"Blue-Ribbon" Jury, 35 IOWA L. REV. 409 (1950); Thatcher, Why Not Use the Special
Jury?, 31 MINN. L. REV. 232 (1947).
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process demands of fairness and rationality are upheld by jury trials
of complex civil litigation. The approach taken by the Third Circuit
recognizes for the first time a due process limitation on the right to
jury trial. H a judge determines that a suit's complexity surpasses
the capacity of a jury to decide rationally, the judge must deny a
pretrial demand for a jury trial. The flexibility that such an ap
proach allows is preferable to a strict adherence to the archaic dis
tinctions between law and equity to determine jury trial rights in
complex litigation. The due process approach adopted by the Third
Circuit is sufficiently limited in scope. It will not lead to the even
tual dilution of the right to jury trial in the vast majority of civil
suits.
The due process approach, however, is not devoid of prob
lems. The approach lends itself to an excessive exercise of judicial
discretion since the judge decides whether a case is too complex
for jury determination. The potential danger is that the judge's ex
ercise of that discretion may be influenced by his desire to elimi
nate the jury so that he may use his decisionmaking power to in
terpose his sentiments and biases into the policy issues sought to
be advanced in the lawsuit.
This note proposes the following approach to the problem of
jury trials in complex litigation. Once a judge determines that
submitting a particular complex case to a jury may violate due
process rights, the alternative of wholesale elimination of the jury
need not, and should not, be employed. In the court's effort to
preserve due process rights, the right to jury trial should be af
forded the utmost protection. The conflict between the right to
jury trial and due process can be reconciled by resorting to innova
tive procedures such as the pretrial conference and reference to a
master or by ordering separate trials of individual claims. If a judge
refuses to exercise his discretion to order separate trials, he may be
mandated by the seventh amendment to do so. H these devices
cannot bring the case within the purview of jury competence, then
the use of special juries, if declared constitutional, may be appro
priate.
The proposed approach also may be the best method of as
suring rational decisionmaking. Complex cases in their present con
figuration may be so intricate and voluminous that neither the
judge nor the jury can render a rational decision. In the final anal
ysis, then, if the quality of justice suffers in overly complex law
suits, the best solution may be to place outer limits on the size of
the litigation submitted to a factfinding body for resolution.
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